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Stock Option Repricing and Executive Turnover 
 
Jon Einar Flåtnes 
 
11. Introduction1
With the increasing importance of stock options as a component of executive 
compensation2, it is important to understand their effectiveness in aligning executive 
interests with those of shareholders and their function as a retention device. With the 
collapse of the tech stock bubble in the past three years, compensation committees of an 
increasing number of firms have repriced previously granted stock options downward.  
While many authors argue that downward repricing is essential to intentivize executives 
and to retain valuable managers, repricing also creates a potential disincentive to 
performance by granting the executive a potential windfall while the stock price 
plummets. Previous studies have been focusing on the underlying factors that determine 
the repricing decision, and less research has been addressing the consequences from this 
board action3. This paper examines the effect of stock option repricing on executive 
turnover. Do firms that choose to reprice experience a relatively lower turnover rate 
among its top executives when compared to firms faced with circumstances in which 
repricing might be chosen, but chose not to? This paper is divided into six sections. 
Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and the existing literature on the topic. 
Section 3 outlines the conceptual model and discusses the ideal data. Section 4 describes 
the actual data, and develops the actual model. Section 5 shows the regression results and 
discusses the findings, and section 6 concludes. 
 
1 The author would like to thank Michael Swendsen for lending me access to the COMPUSTAT database, 
and Martins Blums for helping me extract the data from COMPUSTAT. Moreover, the author wishes to 
thanks Gary Krueger for being a helpful advisor, and for providing insightful comments.  Finally, the 
author would like to thank Matija Vodopivec, Fernando Furquim and Andrew Korsberg for insightful 
comments. 
2 Barkema et. al. (1998), p 135 
3 Core, Guay, Larcker, 2003 (p. 41) 
22. Literature Review
Granting stock options to managers and employees has two functions: 1) a means of 
compensation, and 2) to provide performance and retention incentives. However, if the 
company’s stock price falls below the option exercise price, the options become 
essentially worthless (“out-of-the-money”), and lose much of their incentive effects, 
because pay-performance sensitivity decreases (Murphy, 1999). In response to this some 
companies choose to reset to exercise price in order to reinstate the incentive, and to 
retain good managers. However, although this practice is infrequent4, repricing is 
controversial and has received much criticism from the financial press and from 
institutional investors for rewarding poor performance5.
2.1. Theory
This section outlines the theory behind stock option repricing and discusses previous 
research related to this topic. Economists have developed  theories both for and against 
stock options repricing, making the issue highly controversial. Although there is a vast 
amount of empirical research done on the topic, very few theoretical studies have been 
addressing the issue. What follows is a brief theoretical background on repricing. 
2.1.1. Theory I: Ex-post effects of repricing
Classical agency theory states that if the interests of the shareholders and the managers 
are misaligned, an alignment of the interests can occur through appropriate 
incentivization that is a reward/bonus scheme. Incentive models generally assume 
managers are effort and risk averse (Holmstrom, 1979). Hence, in order to maximize the 
 
4 Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) find that 1.3% of executives they examine had options repriced 
between 1992 and 1995 
5 The Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1999, p. C2; Business Week, February 15, 1999, p. 38 
3net economic value to shareholders, there must exist an efficient compensation contract 
between the company and the manager (Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003).  
 An important indicator of the quality of a pay-performance contract is the degree 
to which the executive’s pay changes relative to changes in company performance, 
referred to as pay-performance sensitivity. Jensen et al. (1990) and John et al. (2003) 
have examined pay-performance sensitivity finding that stock options have among the 
highest pay-performance sensitivities making them an efficient incentive structure when 
the strike price of the options are "in-the-money" (Murphy, 1999). Moreover, the fact that 
executives typically hold many options that are unvested, make them an important 
retention device. Since these unvested options are forfeited upon leaving the firm 
voluntarily, they serve as “golden handcuffs” that encourage executives to stay with their 
current firm (Scholes (1991) and Mehran and Yermack (1997)) 
However, the problem arises when the stock prices fall precipitously, 
considerably reducing the pay-performance sensitivity of stock options as the value of 
options to purchase a stock at a price way above the market weakens the managerial 
incentives and the retentive power of the stock options. If the original contract cannot be 
altered, this will result in “poor continuation outcomes for the principal as well” (Acharya 
et. al., 2000, p.67). For a senior executive officer who holds many underwater options at 
a non-repricing firm, the prospect of obtaining a new compensation package from a 
competing firm may be a compelling reason to depart. Since the costs incurred by losing 
valuable executives and by hiring new ones are high, the firm might consider it profitable 
to alter the terms of the original contact through repricing.  
 
42.1.2. Theory II: Ex-ante effects of repricing
From an ex-ante standpoint, however, the anticipation of repricing has a negative impact 
on incentives present in the original contract (Acharya et. al., 2000, p. 94). Hence, 
credible initial commitment by the principal not to reset contract terms will enhance the 
incentive effect of the original contract. 
 The relative dominance of the re-incentivization and the negative feedback effect 
is what determines the effectiveness of repricing. 
 
2.2. Previous Empirical Research
The literature on stock option repricing has expanded rapidly as options have 
become an increasingly common component of executive compensation. The research 
can be divided into two broad categories: 1) determinants of the repricing decision, and 2) 
the consequences of repricing.  
Most studies on the topic have focused on the determinants of the repricing decision. 
Some of the first empirical research was done by Gilson et al. (1993) who studied a sample 
of 77 firms that file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt during the years 1981 
to 1987. Their results show that repricing firms have under-performed the market for six 
years prior to the repricing date, and that the typical repricing is a fifty percent reduction in 
the exercise price.  
More recent studies have analyzed the determining factors in greater depth by testing 
various models (Brenner, et al., 2000; Chance, et. al. 2000, for example; see table 1 below) 
 
Table 1: Summary of studies where the dependent variable is 1 if repriced, 0 otherwise 
Study Sample Explanatory Method Significant var. 
5variables 
Chen (2004)6
Cross-sectional, 1994-1998, 108 
repricing incidents matched with a 
similar sample of restricting firms 
SIZE, NOOP, 
CEOT, BOSI, STVO, 
CEOC 
Cond. 
logit 
SIZE(+), NOOP(-), 
CEOC(+) 
Carter et al. (2003) 
Cross-sectional, 1998, 135 repricing 
incidents matched with a similar 
sample of non-repricing firms 
INDU, OOMN, 
STRE, INRE, FIAG, 
NOOU, EXTO Logit 
OOMN(+), INDU(+), 
NOOU(+), EXTO(+) 
Chidambaram et al. 
(2001) 
Cross-sectional, 1992-1997, 127 
CEO-repricing incidents and 86 
non-CEO repricing incidents 
INDU, FIAG, BOSI, 
SIZE, CEOT, INSO, 
NOOP  
2-stage 
probit INDU(+), FIAG(-), BOSI(-) 
Carter et al. (2001) 
Cross-sectional, 1998, 263 repricing 
incidents matched with a similar 
sample of non-repricing firms 
OOMN, FIRE, SIZE, 
BOSE, EXCC, 
INOW, INSO  Logit OOMN(+), FIRE(-)  
Brenner et al. (2000)
Panel data, 22,834 executive-year 
observations 
COIN, VOLA, SIZE, 
STRE, MAPO, 
EXOW, INRE  Logit 
COIN(+), INVO(+), SIZE(-), 
STRE(-)  
Chance et al. (2000)
Cross-sectional, 1998, 52 repricing 
incidents matched with a similar 
sample of non-repricing firms 
FRCA, OUDI, SIZE, 
INOW, MABO, 
STVO  Logit FRCA(+), OUDI(-), SIZE(-) 
Pollock et al. (2000)
Panel data, 799 firm-month 
observations 
OOMN, CEOC, 
CEOV, CLBO, 
CEOO, INSO, 
BACE, SIZE  Logit 
OOMN(+), CEOC(+), 
CEOV(-), CLBO(-),  
CEOO(-), INSO(-)  
VAR Variable description VAR Variable description VAR Variable description 
BACE 
Number of board members appointed after 
CEO EXCC 
Presence of any of five top 
executives on compensation 
committee MABO Market to book 
BOSE % of board seats held by top 5 executives EXTO 
% of executives to leave the firm 
one year in advance MAPO Managerial position of the executive 
BOSI Board size EXOW Executive ownership NOOP Number of options held by executive 
CEOC 
Dummy for whether the CEO is a 
chairman FIAG Firm age NOOU Number of options outstanding 
CEOO CEO ownership FIRE Firm-specific return OOMN
Degree to which the option is out-of-
money 
CEOT CEO tenure FRCA Free cash flow OUDI % outside directors 
CEOV CEO Visiability INDU Dummies for industry SIZE Size 
CLBO Classified board INOW Inside ownership STRE Stock return 
COIN 
Conflict of interest on compensation 
committee  INRE Industry return STVO Stock volatility 
INSO Institutional ownership VOLA Industry volatility 
Although they use the same dependent variable (a dummy for whether a company 
has repriced or not), their independent variables, sample size, sample source and estimation 
techniques are different, leading to highly conflicting results. Especially, these differences are 
 
6 Chen (2004) used whether a company restricts repricing or not as the dependent variable 
6caused by the difficulty in constructing an adequate control sample for non-repricing firms. 
Chance et al. (2000) used a sample of 37 firms that repriced in the period 1985-1994, and 
matched each firm with a non-repricing firm according to a set of criteria, such as prior 
stock market performance, industry and size. A similar approach was taken by Chidambaran 
et al. (2001) and Carter et al (2001), both of which construct a control sample of non-
repricing firms that have experienced a similar history of stock decline. Alternatively, 
Brenner et al. (2000) and Pollock et al. (2001) included all the data available in the 
EXECUCOMP database or those in a specific industry, and thus did not create a matched 
sample. However, this approach has been criticized for omitting several factors that may be 
important to the repricing decision (Carter et al., 2001), and hence the matching method 
used by Carter et al. is preferable. 
Although the results from the various studies differ widely, some findings are 
relatively consistent. Repricing firms tend to be new, small, high technology firms with 
options that are highly out-of-the-money and poor firm-specific stock performance. 
The second category of studies examines the consequences of repricing on financial 
performance, executive wealth, shareholder wealth and executive and employee turnover, 
which is the study of the current paper. 
 The effect of repricing on executive turnover has been addressed in several recent 
studies, none of which have found any evidence that repricing results in lower executive 
turnover (Chidambaran et al., 2001; Daily, et al., 2001; Carter et al., 2001). The most 
important studies are summarized in table 2:  
Table 2: Summary of studies where the dependent is 1 if an executive voluntarily leaves the company, 0 
otherwise): 
Study Sample 
Explanatory 
variables Method Results 
7Chen (2004) 
Cross-sectional, 1994-1998, 108 
repricing incidents matched with a 
similar sample of restricting firms 
SIZE, STRE, 
REST Probit SIZE(-), REST(-) 
Carter and Lynch (2003)* 
Cross-sectional, 1998, 135 repricing 
incidents matched with a similar 
sample of non-repricing firms 
OOMN, 
REPR, 
EXTO, STRE, 
SALE, AGEE
OLS, 
Heckman OOMN(+) 
Chidambaram et al. (2001) 
Cross-sectional, 1992-1997, 127 CEO-
repricing incidents and 86 non-CEO 
repricing incidents 
SALE, STRE, 
INDU, REPR, 
NOSH 
2-stage 
probit 
STRE(-), INDU, 
NOSH(-), REPR(-) 
VAR Variable description 
AGEE Average age of top five executives 
EXTO % of executives to leave the firm one year in advance 
NOSH Number of shares held by CEO 
OOMN Degree to which the option is out-of-money 
REPR Repricing dummy 
REST 1 if the firm has repricing restrictions 
SALE Total sales 
SIZE Total assets 
STRE Stock return 
In fact, some studies have found that CEO turnover is higher for repricing firms 
relative to a carefully selected control group of non-repricers, and that it stays significantly 
higher over the two years following the repricing (Daily et al, 2002). Interestingly, however, 
Carter et al. (2003), find that employee turnover is significantly reduced in the year following 
the repricing. This is consistent with Oyer and Schaefer (2002), who suggest that options are 
granted to employees primarily as a retention device, rather than providing performance 
incentives.  
 The literature has also addressed the issue of timing of option repricings. A study 
conducted by Callaghan et al. (2000) investigated the change in stock price around the 
repricing date, and found that “on the day of the repricing and for about four weeks 
thereafter, [there is] an increase in stock price that appears permanently impounded in future 
stock price (…) In addition, repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good 
news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements”. These 
8findings strongly suggest that managers can influence the repricing date, resulting in a 
significant benefit to themselves and, thus, in an additional cost to shareholders. 
 Although previous empirical research has provided some very useful insights as to 
why some firms choose to reprice, and identified some of the consequences of this action, 
the effect of repricing on firm performance has not been thoroughly investigated. Several 
studies have provided some descriptive statistics on the topic, but their findings are very 
inconsistent. Chidambaran et al. (2001) document that repricing firms improve their 
operating performance relative to the repricing year but do not recover their historical 
profitability levels. However, they do not formally test for abnormal performance. In small-
sample studies, Chance et al. (2000) find no abnormal returns in the 250-day post-repricing 
period, whereas Callaghan et al. (2000) document significant positive abnormal returns over 
the 120-day and 250-day post-repricing period, even for the sample period analyzed by 
Chance et al. (2000). 
 
3. Conceptual Model
Based on the theoretical rationale for repricing as outlined in section 2.1.1, we would 
expect executive turnover (T) in period t+1 to be a function of whether the company 
repriced its stock options in period t or not (R), in addition to a set of control variables. 
Hence, we have the following basic conceptual model: 
(1) T=f(controls, R0,1)
Consistent with previous empirical research7, executive turnover is determined by four 
main conceptual measures: company characteristics (C), executive characteristics (E), 
pay-performance sensitivity (P) and executive labor market characteristics (M): 
 
7 See for example, Coughlan et al. (1985), Warner et al. (1988), Murphy et al. (1993) 
9(2) T=f(C, E, P, M) 
First, company characteristics include factors such as size, performance and work 
environment, all of which are influential in the executive’s decision to stay with the 
company or to resign. Consistent with Warner et al. (1988), we expect a positive relation 
between firm size and turnover. Performance is expected to be negatively correlated with 
turnover, because positive performance is indicative of good leadership, and thus an 
executive is more likely to stay in a position in which he/she does a high-quality job. A 
stimulating work environment is also predicted to reduce executive turnover. 
Second, executive characteristics include among others, age, and the degree to 
which the company’s interests and executive interests are aligned. If executives’ being 
closer to retirement leads to higher turnover, we expect a positive relation between age 
and turnover. On the other hand, if young executives are more mobile and less loyal to 
the firm, we expect a negative relation between age and turnover8.
An improvement of the pay-performance sensitivity is also expected to provide a 
greater incentive for executives to stay with the firm, and hence reduce turnover. Since 
the intention of repricing is to raise the pay-performance sensitivity, this is the 
mechanism through which repricing is expected to reduce turnover. 
Finally, the characteristics of the executive labor market are important 
determinants of an executive’s decision to leave the company. If other companies offer 
better compensation packages, and a more attractive work environment, executives will 
be more likely to quit. 
 As suggested by previous literature, a regression using model (2) could potentially 
lead to inconsistent estimates. The repricing decision and the resignation by an executive 
 
8 Carter et al. (2003) 
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could happen simultaneously, possibly generating a sample selection bias. The 
endogeneity can be corrected for by using the two-step procedure as suggested in 
Heckman (1979). In the first step, we estimate a probit model for the repricing decision. 
The second stage uses the inverse Mills ratio to estimate a consistent model of executive 
turnover.  Hence, our conceptual model contains the following system of equations: 
(3) T=f(C, E, P, M, R0,1)
(4) R0,1=f(C, P, M) 
Model (4) is based on previous empirical literature, discussed in section 2.2. It states 
that the repricing decision is based on company characteristics, current pay-performance 
sensitivity, and executive labor market characteristics.  
 
3.1. Ideal Data
Ideally, we would be able to measure voluntary turnover separately from forced 
resignation. Since we are only interested in the effect repricing has on executives’ 
decision to stay with the company or not, the cases where the executive’s contract is 
being terminated by the company will introduce a bias to our estimates. 
 Data on company characteristics would ideally include accurate performance data 
based on a large set of financial measures, and data on the company’s work environment, 
such as the executive’s relationship with other employees and the physical setting in 
which the executive is working. Although these factors are difficult to measure, they 
could possibly be captured using a company level survey. 
11
 Executive characteristics are also hard to quantify. However, ideal data would 
include measures of the executive’s age, family situation, career plans and whether or not 
his goals are aligned with those of the company. 
 Ideal data on the pay-performance sensitively would take into account the fact 
that the performance of a company can be due to exogenous factors or to factors directly 
attributable to an executive. Hence, ideally we would be able to measure the degree to 
which the company’s performance can be directly related to actions taken by the 
executive. This would allow us to compute the impact this has on the executive’s 
compensation.  
 The characteristics of the labor market for executives could ideally be measured 
as a set of variables capturing the relative attractiveness of job offers in other companies. 
Data would include details, such as compensation, of all the job offers available to the 
executive at any point in time. 
 Finally, in order to best examine the impact of repricing on executive turnover, 
we would ideally obtain data on when the executive makes the decision to resign as 
opposed to when his resignation is announced. Moreover, panel data would make it 
possible to compare a repricing event with another point in time when the same company 
faced the same economic situation, but chose not to reprice. In addition, we would ideally 
get data on when the managers knew about the repricing, in contrast to when the 
repricing actually occurs.   
 
4. Actual Data and Variables
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Unfortunately, our data are far from ideal. However, consistent with previous research, 
we use overall executive turnover as a proxy for voluntary turnover. Moreover, in order 
to estimate CEO turnover, we also use a limited dependent variable which takes one if the 
CEO leaves the company in the year of repricing, and zero otherwise. The data are found 
by manually scanning through proxy statements for each company over several years in 
order to determine which executives appeared on the compensation table for a given year, 
but not for the next year9. Proxy statements are available from EdgarOnline10.
As a proxy for company characteristics, we use book value of assets to capture 
size, and past stock performance to approximate company performance. This is consistent 
with most previous research. Also, as suggested by several empirical studies, industry 
dummies significantly account for differences in executive turnover, and thus will be 
included in our model. All these data are available from the COMPUSTAT database.  
 Data on executive characteristics are not only unavailable, but the measures are 
often hard to quantify. Hence, merely CEO age will be used, since it is available from 
proxy statements and is believed to have a significant impact on CEO turnover11.
As suggested by previous empirical research, the percentage of common shares 
held by the executive is a good proxy for pay-performance sensitivity. Although it does 
not correct for the fact that performance might be attributable to factors over which the 
executive has had no influence, it should be a good measure of how responsive an 
 
9 Each company must submit a proxy statement to the SEC annually. This contains, among others, 
compensation data for all executives whose salary exceeds $100,000 a year, in addition to data on 
executives’ ages, and beneficiary ownership (only reported for those who own more than 1% of common 
stock) 
10 http://textsearch.edgarexplorer.com/prosearch.asp
11 Carter et al. (2003) is the only study using the age variable. However, instead of CEO age, they used the 
average age for all executives listed in the proxy statement.  
13
executive’s compensation is to the general stock performance of the company. Data on 
common shares held by the largest shareholders are available from proxy statements. 
 No previous studies have used measures that capture the characteristics of the 
executive labor market, since data on the details of executive job openings are not 
publicly available for a large number of companies. Hence, although this certainly is an 
important determinant of executive turnover, we will not include it in our model due to 
data unavailability. 
 Stock option repricing data are available from the EXECUCOMP database. 
Unfortunately, however, I do not have access to this database, and I therefore obtained 
my data by performing a search on EdgarOnline and scanning through firms’ proxy 
statements. As noted in section 2.2, a similar technique was employed by Carter et al. 
(2001), and although it gives accurate data on the repricing date, this method limits the 
sample size due to very time-consuming data collection process. 
Data were compiled by first identifying repricing instances (i.e. company name 
and repricing date), and then collecting the appropriate data for the year of repricing, the 
preceding year, and the succeeding year. Consistent with previous research, a control 
sample was also created, consisting of firms that most closely matched the decline in 
performance for each company during the six months prior to the repricing incident, but 
chose not to reprice. Hence, our final dataset contains cross-sectional data for 62 
companies and 73 repricing instances. 
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4.1. Actual Model
Based on the theory outlined in previous sections and the availability of data, we employ 
the following model (expected signs are in parentheses):  
(5)  CEOTURN(0,1)i= ßo + ß1log(SIZEi,) + ß2STRET[-12, -6]i + ß3 STRET[-6, 0]i +
(+)                    (-)                       (-) 
ß4STRET[0, 6]i, + ß5HITECH(0,1)i + ß6EXETURN[-12,0]i +
(-)                        (+)     (+)           
ß7CEOAGEi +ß8CEOSHARESi + ß9REPRICE(0,1)i+ T
(+/-)          (-)   (-) 
 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
CEOTURN(0,1) = 1 if the CEO leaves the company during the year of repricing or during 
the following year; 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Book value of assets 
STRET[X, Y] = Stock return between month X and Y where X and Y are the months 
relative to the repricing event.  
HITECH(0,1) = 1 if the company is a technology firm (as defined by the SIC code); 0 
otherwise 
EXETURN[-12,0] = Number of top-five executives who leave the company during the 
one year preceding the repricing event. 
CEOAGE = The age of the CEO at the time of repricing. 
CEOSHARES = The percentage of common stock owned by the CEO. 
REPRICE(0,1) = 1 if the stock options were repriced; 0 otherwise 
Each variable is given for firm i. 
The justifications for the expected signs are based on the discussion in section 2 and 3.  
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Although the sign on SIZE can be ambiguous, it has been argued in the literature 
that larger firms are expected to have higher executive turnover due to a larger degree of 
agency problems. Such problems are more pronounced in larger, mature firms which 
have more diffuse ownership and greater separation between ownership and control12.
Thus we expect a positive sign on SIZE. 
Since higher past and current stock returns are indicative of good leadership, 
executives are more likely to stay in a successful position, than in one under which 
performance has declined. Moreover, positive stock returns will increase the value of the 
stocks and options owned by the executive, and hence he/she has an incentive to stay 
with the company, since these unvested options are forfeited upon leaving the firm 
voluntarily. Hence, we expect a negative sign for all the stock return variables. 
 Technology firms were shown to have higher executive turnover rates by Carter et 
al. (2001). Since the technology sector is generally more risky, executives would tend to 
be more mobile than in other sectors. Thus, we expect a positive sign on HITECH(0,1).
Past executive turnover could be an indication that the company has trouble 
retaining its executives. Hence, we would expect to see higher turnover in companies 
with a history of frequent executive turnover. Thus, a negative sign is expected for the 
EXETURN[-12,0] variable. 
 If executives’ being closer to retirement leads to higher turnover, we expect a 
positive relation between age and turnover. On the other hand, if young executives are 
more mobile and less loyal to the firm, we expect a negative relation between age and 
turnover. Thus the predicted sign of CEOAGE is ambivalent. 
 
12 Chidambaran et al. (2001), Warner et al. (1988) 
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 The CEOSHARES variable is expected to be negatively correlated with executive 
turnover, since higher executive ownership of common stock will increase the pay-
performance sensitivity. Hence, we predict a negative sign. 
 Repricing is expected to reduce CEO turnover by reinstating the retentive power 
of the executive stock options. Thus, we should see a negative sign for REPRICE(0,1) 
In order to correct for the potential endogeneity of the REPRICE variable, we also 
estimate the following simultaneous system of equations using a two-stage Heckman 
procedure. We also use overall executive turnover as the dependent variable instead of 
CEO turnover: 
(6)  EXETURNi= ßo + ß1log(SIZEi,) + ß2STRET[-12, -6]i + ß3 STRET[-6, 0]i +
(+)                    (-)                       (-) 
ß4STRET[0, 6]i, + ß5HITECH(0,1)i + ß6EXETURN[-12,0]i +
(-)                        (+)     (+)           
ß7REPRICE(0,1)i+ T
(-) 
 
(7)  REPRICE(0,1)i= ßo + ß1log(SIZEi,) + ß2STRET[-12, -6]i + ß3 STRET[-6, 0]i +
(+/-)                    (-)                       (-) 
ß4STRET[0, 6]i, + ß5HITECH(0,1)i + ß6EXETURN[-12,0]i +
(-)                        (+)     (+)           
ß7CEOSHARESi + T
(+)  
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5. Results
The results obtained by estimating the probit model in (5) are displayed in table 3: 
Table 3:
Probit regression of model (5). Dependent variable is 1 if the CEO leaves the company 
during the year of repricing or the following year, 0 otherwise. Z-statistics are in 
parenthesis. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Coeff. 
Marginal Effects 
(dy/dx) 
Intercept -1.876
(-1.54)
Log(Sales) -0.280 -0.046
(+) (-2.75)***
Return [-12,-6] 0.525 0.086
(-) (1.72)*
Return [-6,0] -0.429 -0.070
(-) (-0.8)
Return [0,6] -0.804 -0.131
(-) (-2.08)**
Technology -0.045 -0.007
(Dummy) (+) (-0.09)
Exec. Resign [-12,0] -0.316 -0.051
(+) (-1.08)
CEO Age 0.048 0.008
(+/-) (2.06)**
% Shares held by CEO -2.140 -0.349
(-) (-0.95)
CEO Options Repriced -0.934 -0.229
(Dummy) (-) (-1.22)
N 74
Pseudo R2 0.33
Log likelihood -23.06
2 (p-value) 22.65 (0.01)
*=Significant on a 10% level; **=Significant on a 5% level; ***=Significant on a 1% level 
18
As apparent from table 3, the variables log(sales), return [-12,-6], return [0,6] and 
CEO age are significant in explaining CEO turnover. However, we find no evidence that 
repricing is associated with lower CEO turnover, as the relation between CEO turnover 
and the repricing dummy is not significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, the sign 
is as predicted, which is a weak indication that turnover is lower in repricing firms.  
Surprisingly, on the other hand, we find the coefficient for log(sales), the measure 
for size, to be negative and significant at a 1% level. This implies that smaller firms have 
higher CEO turnover, which conflicts with the findings in Carter et al. (2003), 
Chidambaran et al. (2001), Warner et al. (1988) and most other empirical studies. Hence, 
either our model is incorrectly specified or since our sample has an overrepresentation of 
repricing firms, it is possible that among repricing firms, size is negatively correlated 
with turnover.  
Furthermore, we observe that stock return for the six months preceding the 
repricing event and the six months following it is negatively correlated with CEO 
turnover, as predicted. The marginal effects are -.07 and -.13, respectively, implying that 
a 100% increase in stock return during the six months leading up to the options being 
repriced, is associated with a 7% decline in the probability that the CEO leaves the 
company. The decline is 13% when considering stock return for the six months following 
the repricing. However, stock return for the next six months preceding the repricing event 
shows a significant positive correlation with turnover. Although this result is hard to 
explain, it could be due to a potential negative correlation between stock return for 
successive intervals, caused by cyclical stock price fluctuations. 
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The dummy for technology firms has a negative coefficient, which conflicts with 
the theory that these firms have higher CEO turnover. However, since the finding is not 
significant, no interpretations can be made based on this result. 
 A similar conclusion can be made for the executive resignations [-12, 0] variable. 
One would expect to observe a higher probability of CEO turnover in those companies 
with a history of high executive turnover. However, since our findings yield a negative, 
insignificant coefficient, these results should not be relied upon. 
The coefficient on CEO age, on the other hand, is highly significant, and its 
positive sign is consistent with the theory that CEOs who are closer to retirement have a 
higher probability of resigning. Our results imply that a CEO, whose age is twice that of 
another CEO, has a 0.008% higher chance of leaving the company. 
Moreover, the percentage of shares held by the CEO has a negative, but not 
significant, coefficient. This is consistent with the theory that higher CEO ownership of 
common stock increases the pay-performance sensitivity, and hence reduces turnover. 
The marginal effect of 0.35 implies that the impact is relatively large; however, since the 
coefficient is not significant, this result might be due to randomness. 
As outlined in previous sections, the potential endogeneity of the repricing 
variable could introduce a selection bias, and hence make the estimates in model (5) 
inconsistent. Therefore, in order to obtain consistent estimators, we run a Heckman two-
stage procedure, where the first stage is a probit model where CEO repricing (0,1) is the 
dependent variable, and the second stage uses the inverse Mills ratio to estimate overall 
executive turnover13. Table 4 displays the results from this regression: 
 
13 Executive turnover is used instead of CEO turnover, since the latter variable only includes a few positive 
cases (i.e. where the value of the dummy is 1)  
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Table 4:
First column is an OLS regression of model (6). T-statistics are in parenthesis. Third 
column shows the first stage of a Heckman and is thus a probit regression where CEO 
repricing (0,1) is the dependent variable. Column two shows the second stage of the 
Heckman using the inverse Mills ratio generated from the first stage. Z-statistics are in 
parenthesis. 
OLS Heckman St. 2 Heckman St. 1 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Executive 
Turnover 
Executive 
Turnover CEO Repriced 
Intercept -0.546 0.355 1.648
(-1.13) (0.94) (2.59)***
Log(Sales) 0.082 0.074 -0.203
(+) (1.32) (0.83) (-1.63)*
Return [-12,-6] -0.502 -0.467 0.820
(-) (-2.29)** (-1.87)* (1.08)
Return [-6,0] -0.326 -0.470 -0.448
(-) (-1.17) (-1.27) (-1.17)
Return [0,6] -0.287 -0.366 -0.563
(-) (-1.44) (-1.26) (-1.6)*
Technology 0.954 1.033 0.228
(Dummy) (+) (3.23)*** (3.27)*** (0.42)
Exec. Resign [-12,0] 0.231 0.237 0.640
(+) (1.3) (1.05) (1.43)
CEO Age 
% Shares held by CEO 0.066
(0.05)
CEO Options Repriced 1.027
(Dummy) (-) (2.36)**
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.412
(0.30)
N 74 74 74
Adj. R2 0.16
F-stat (p-value) 3.05 (0.01)
2 (p-value) 22.39  (0.03)
*=Significant on a 10% level; **=Significant on a 5% level; ***=Significant on a 1% 
level 
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The results in table 4 show that all signs are as expected except for the repricing variable, 
which in the OLS regression has a positive and significant coefficient. This could be due 
to the potential endogeneity of repricing, and thus column two will give more consistent 
estimates. We observe, however, that the other variables remain relatively unchanged14.
Two striking differences between the results from model (5) and model (6) is that 
for model (6), executive turnover is, as expected, positively related to both size and the 
technology dummy. The fact that such a positive relationship was lacking when using 
CEO turnover as the dependent variable, could be due to the fact that this variable only 
contains a few incidents of actual CEO turnover, and hence we would need a larger 
sample in order to get accurate and significant estimates.  
 
6. Conclusion
Despite the fact that many companies resort to repricing as a method of reinstating the 
retentive power of stock options that have fallen far below their exercise price, this 
practice has received strong criticism from the financial press and institutional investors 
for rewarding managers for poor performance, and some see it as an example of 
managerial entrenchment. This study examines the hypothesis that repricing results in 
lower executive turnover. Specifically, we estimate a model of executive turnover as a 
function of company size, past and current stock returns, industry, past turnover, CEO 
age, CEO ownership of company shares and a dummy specifying whether executive 
stock options have been repriced. Our results do not support the hypothesis that repricing 
reduces neither executive turnover nor CEO turnover. However, we do find evidence that 
 
14 A Hausman test between the OLS regression and the Heckman model shows that we can reject the 
hypothesis that the OLS model is exogenous. 
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past and current stock return, company size and CEO age are significant in explaining 
CEO turnover. Moreover, our results indicate that overall executive turnover is 
significantly higher in technology firms and lower in companies with positive past stock 
returns. Our findings are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of the 
repricing decision. Overall, our results provide little support for firms’ arguments for 
repricing executive stock options. 
 Since data are lacking for some important determinants of executive turnover, the 
results from previous studies, including the current study, might not be valid. Hence, 
future research would focus on compiling data for a larger set of variables, such as 
characteristics of the executive labor market. Moreover, if the proposed law is 
implemented that would require shareholder approval of repricing, this would open up a 
new set of questions regarding stock option repricing, performance and retention. 
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